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Abstract: Since early cybernetics studies by Wiener, Pask, and Ashby, the properties of living systems
are subject to deep investigations. The goals of this endeavour are both understanding and building:
abstract models and general principles are sought for describing organisms, their dynamics and their
ability to produce adaptive behavior. This research has achieved prominent results in fields such as
artificial intelligence and artificial life. For example, today we have robots capable of exploring hostile
environments with high level of self-sufficiency, planning capabilities and able to learn. Nevertheless,
the discrepancy between the emergence and evolution of life and artificial systems is still huge. In this
paper, we identify the fundamental elements that characterize the evolution of the biosphere and
open-ended evolution, and we illustrate their implications for the evolution of artificial systems.
Subsequently, we discuss the most relevant issues and questions that this viewpoint poses both for
biological and artificial systems.
Keywords: emergence; evolution; critical dynamics; cybernetics; information; biosemiotics; constraint
closure; Kantian whole; affordance; entailing laws; consciousness
1. Introduction
Can one formulate broad principles for evolving proto-cells, single cell organisms, perhaps
multi-celled organisms and even robots, which live in their complex worlds, adapt, and survive, can
grow more complex and diverse in an abiotic or biotic environment co-evolving with one another?
Building on Ashby’s ideas presented in Design for a brain [1], we address these questions trying to
identify a minimal set of necessary and sufficient properties that are likely to characterize living
organisms—and also artificial systems—that evolve in open environments.
A first property is the ability of discriminating what is beneficial or disadvantageous for the
organism, “what’s good or bad”, in Ashby’s terms. This discrimination capability consists in being
able to classify relevant information from the environment, and it leans on sensors that can capture the
relevant information for categorizing external stimuli. The detection of relevant information is a way
of meaning creation: what is important for the survival of the organism in its environmental niche
shapes the evolution of specialized sensors, so the patterns and the correlations they capture come to
exist and get a name. Not just data streams collected by sensors, but semantic information. Besides the
capability of capturing relevant information from the environment, for surviving the organism must
be able to use this information properly. As a consequence, mechanisms and means for acting in the
world should also be developed. In robotic terms, we may speak of actuators and effectors [2], but we
also include here the ability of taking decisions and act, i.e., having a control policy—that should also
be adapted and changed.
The presence of these properties in an evolutionary setting that is characterized by heritable
variations and selection, along with individual adapting and learning mechanisms, is the basis for
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enabling open-ended evolution. We observe that these capabilities are common to all living organisms,
but they may well be crucial also for proto-cells. For a proto-cell, sensing its world, evaluating
it as “good or bad for me” and acting reliably and appropriately would have been of enormous
selective advantage.
In this work, we first discuss the limits of current approaches to artificial evolution and adaptation
in Section 2, by outlining the elements that are relevant for our discussion with particular focus on
robotics. In Section 3, building upon Ashby’s argument, we detail the properties that organisms
and possibly artificial systems should possess to be able to exhibit adaptive behavior and evolve.
The implications of these hypotheses are discussed in Sections 4 and 5, where we elaborate on
affordances, constraint and work closures, semantic information, and dynamical criticality, which
play an essential part in open evolution and co-evolution of systems. Finally, in Section 6, we debate
whether mind has some role in the evolution of the biosphere.
2. Current Limits in Robotic Evolution and Adaptivity
Robot designers usually try to endow their creatures with some kind of adaptivity, which can
range from the simple automatic adjustment of a proximity sensor threshold to the capability of
learning new plans to achieve given goals [3]. This property enables the robot to face perturbations
in an unpredictable environment, keep its basic functionalities (i.e., self-sufficiency), and pursue its
goals. Early cyberneticists, such as Ashby [1], refer to the notion of homeostasis, meaning that the
robot is able to keep some essential variables within given limits. We can generalize the notion of
homeostasis adding to self-sufficiency also the requirement to achieve given goals (a goal can be “reach
the light”, “sweep the floor”, but also more generic, such as “explore new areas”). Every kind of
adaptive mechanism involves some modification inside the robot, either in its morphology or, more
often, in the controller.
Among the kinds of adaptivity, biologists also include evolution, which acts upon populations of
individuals and adapt them by genetic adjustments. Artificial evolution is also used to design robots [4,5].
The principles of Evolutionary Robotics (ER) are rather simple: the controller (and sometimes also the
morphology) of a robot is encoded in a formal representation subject to genetic-like operations, such as
mutation and recombination. The fitness of a robot is estimated by evaluating robot’s behavior, almost
always in a simulator. Subsequently, on the basis of fitness assessment, selection takes place and new
individuals are produced by applying genetic operators. This cycle is iterated until a given termination
condition is met, e.g., a solution with sufficiently high fitness has been found. Evolutionary robotics
has attained interesting results, especially concerning proofs of principle, but it is still not particularly
successful in applications [5,6]. Setting aside the questions concerning possible improvement of ER as an
engineering tool, we emphasize two important points. First, ER almost always depends upon a simulator;
this means that fitness is evaluated in a different environment than the one in which the robot will operate
and, above all, the simulator is supposed to reproduce at least all the properties of the world that the
designer believes are relevant for the robot to accomplish its task. (There might be also non-relevant
properties, of course, that the evolutionary process might anyway exploit) Second, the fitness function is
externally defined and it should not just represent a coherent evaluation of robot’s behavior, but it should
also provide a guide to the evolutionary process (i.e., it should be defined in such a way that the fitness
values and genotype distance in terms of genetic operators are sufficiently correlated). These two latter
observations also hold for most adaptive mechanisms, not based on artificial evolution.
In general, we can state that, when we build robots, we prescribe in advance: evaluation function
(i.e., the robot is programmed already to know what’s good for it), sensors (at least the relevant ones),
actuators (at least the ones needed for making actions according to the maximization of the evaluation
function). In short, we have constructed the robot such that it can learn to do what we want to do
within the world that it can know and in which it can act with respect to the relevant features we have
predefined (notice that evolution of life predefines none of these).
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If nothing changes in the robot and in the environment, at the end of the process we can find a
robot able to attain sufficiently high values of the evaluation function. In this setting, nothing actually
novel can emerge, as, in principle, boundary and initial conditions are known.
It is important to emphasize an issue concerning simulation: the simulator is an abstraction of the
world encoded in a formal language; therefore, deduction can, in principle, be applied to entail the
possible outcomes of an artificial evolutionary process [7]. Here, we exclude phenomena due to bugs
in the code that can be exploited by the evolutionary process (e.g., for an error in the implementation
of the energy consumption rule, moving backward increases robot’s energy). These are unexpected
behaviors due to incomplete knowledge of the designer about the simulator. The point is that usually
in robotics simulations there is no concept or idea that a physical object can be used in more than one
way. Using objects in more than one way is a source of emergent behavior. Let’s consider the many
uses of a screwdriver: it is not possible to conceive an algorithm that can either list all the possible uses
of the screwdriver, or enumerate them implicitly by returning the "next use". The number of uses of
a screwdriver is not infinite, but rather indefinite (the uses are in a nominal scale). Conversely, in a
simulator, all of the elementary properties of objects and their relations with other objects are modeled;
therefore, in principle, we could list or define a procedure to enumerate all the possible uses of an
object, hence no actual emergent behavior can take place.
Anyway, in the limits of the initial and boundary conditions provided by the simulator, some
sort of emergent phenomena can still arise. For example, simulated robots may develop signaling
behaviors that are beneficial to group evolution [8], or they may find a sensory-motor coordination
pattern that solves a complicated task [4]. These behaviors might be unexpected, as many phenomena
observed in artificial evolution and simulation are [9]. Nevertheless, these behaviors are limited by the
boundary conditions defined by the simulator and, therefore, the phase space in which the evolution
of the robots takes place does not change. Hence, while simulation is useful for practical purposes,
for observing actual and open emergent behaviors, we need robots embodied in the physical world.
However, embodiment alone is not enough. Let us suppose to set up the adaptive process,
either evolutionary or not, in the physical world so as to overcome the limitations of simulation.
Additionally, in this case, all the properties of the world and the robots are anyway pre-specified by
the designer, starting from sensors and actuators. For example, if the task the robot has to accomplish
is to sweep the floor in a room, autonomously going to the recharging area when necessary, practical
constructive reasons would suggest the designer to equip the robot only with the necessary sensors
(e.g., battery level indicator, proximity sensors, and camera) and actuators (e.g., wheels, recharging
plug, vacuum cleaner). It would be quite improbable to find a designer mounting also a thermometer
and a laser pointer. The reason is that the designer, often forced to satisfy constructive and energetic
requirements, has conceived in advance that a solution (in fact, one of the many ones) will make use
of those specific sensors and actuators. The adaptive process will then produce a suitable behavior
policy for this specific context. While this approach is a perfectly plausible way for practical purposes,
it is inappropriate when robots are the setting for constructive biology or cybernetic experiments,
because this is surely not representative of biological adaptation phenomena. Therefore, the question
arises as to what are the choices we have to take if we want to set up the conditions for the actual
emergence of organisms, following Ashby who asked “to what extent is the machine restricted by the
limitations of its designer?” [10].
3. Towards the Design for an Evolving Organism
In this section, we discuss the elements that we believe are at the core of the emergence of
organisms, either natural or artificial. As we will see, these ingredients enable the properties that
characterize open-ended evolution in the biosphere and, therefore, provide a viable way for addressing
emergence and evolution in the artificial world.
Entropy 2020, 22, 1163 4 of 12
3.1. The Evaluation Function
In robotics, adaptive mechanisms, such as learning and evolution, require the definition of a
merit factor that is used as a feedback for the adaptive process, e.g., a fitness function in evolutionary
computation techniques. These functions are externally defined, but their implicit purpose is to provide
a value system to the robot, such that it is able to take decisions that are beneficial to its self-sufficiency
and goals. Living organisms act so as to take what is good for their survival and goal achievement.
On the other hand, by acting in this way they are likely to survive longer and, thus, spread their genetic
material to the next generations. In essence, if they are endowed with a suitable value system and act
accordingly, they attain both an individual advantage, as they keep homeostasis and achieve their
goals, and a phylogenetic one. Let’s start from the simplest condition: a bacterium must find food
to survive, hence, if the actions it takes lead it to the food, then they are “good”, otherwise they are
labeled as “bad”. This binary choice becomes more articulated when quantities also come into play:
the bacterium chooses the way to more food, over the one with less food. Therefore, this value is no
longer binary, but ranging across a continuum. In the general case, organisms face conflicts among
possible options and must make a choice, and their value system provides the basis upon which to
choose. In this context, emotions have a primary role, as they are involved in the self-regulatory
sensory system of organisms and category formation [11].
Ashby [1] suggests formalizing this concept by considering essential variables: if essential
variables are kept in a given range, then the system is fine, i.e., if the system is able to act, so
that its essential variables are within the given range, then it survives. This notion can be easily
generalized to include in survival not just self-sustainability, but also the achievement of goals [12].
A dynamical systems perspective of agents and environment [13] provides a suitable formal framework
for this generalization.
From an abstract viewpoint, we can state that surviving means keeping organismal individuality,
i.e., the property enjoyed by Kantian wholes that achieve constraint closures and self-reproduce (a
Kantian whole is an organized being that has the property that the parts exist for and by means of
the whole [14,15]). These systems achieve catalytic closure: "each reaction or non-equilibrium process
which must be catalyzed finds a catalyst in the system itself" [16]. An individual is a Kantian whole
that achieves constraint closure, whereby each of a closed set of non-equilibrium processes constructs
constraints that enable other processes to construct further constraints, in a circular way [17–19].
These Kantian wholes are also capable of heritable variations and natural selection, such that they can
co-evolve to be critical. Constraints enable a process to do work, which is the constrained release of
energy into a few degrees of freedom [20,21]. Constraint closure, plus the other things that constraints
closed systems can build, define the boundaries of the individual. The individual lives in its abiotic and
biotic world, defining its niche. The niche of an individual is what von Uexküll calls Umwelt [22,23],
i.e., the subjective world of an organism, and it cannot be defined non-circularly. A further property is
that organisms should be mutually critical. While the notion of criticality will be discussed in length in
Section 5, we briefly anticipate here that organisms should be mutually critical, because they need to
understand and interact with each other [24]. Finally, we observe that there have been recent attempts
to provide rigorous quantitative methods for identifying individuals based on information theory [25],
which emphasizes the role of the capability of using past information to condition future actions.
In addition, a hybrid view that integrates the historical and relational conception of identity [26] has
recently been proposed [27].
3.2. Sensors and Actuators
As observed in Section 2, if robots are equipped ab initio with sensors that acquire the information
that is necessary for their survival, then the boundary conditions for their adaptation and evolution
are already set and cannot change. Therefore, we need to set up a mechanism enabling the organism
to extract and/or create useful information from the environment in order to avoid to inject ad hoc
knowledge. To this purpose, we need either an evolutionary mechanism acting on populations of
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organisms (primarily by heritable variation and selection) or providing the organisms the capability of
adaptively evolving and/or constructing sensors, or both. Cybernetics scholars have indeed explored
the evolution of sensors, starting from the pioneer work by Pask [28] to more recent works [29–31].
As remarked by Cariani in [32] rephrasing Ashby, “in order to achieve better performance over its
initial specification, a device must be informationally open, capable of interacting with the world
independently of its designer, the device must have some degree of epistemic autonomy in order to
improve itself, but epistemic autonomy is not achievable without some degree of structural autonomy”.
In other terms, no improvement is possible if the organism is not able to change something in its
structure, so as to autonomously find ways to profit from useful correlations in its environment.
For example, if energy sockets are under light bulbs, a robot could detect and reach them faster if
it is capable of developing an electromagnetic sensor for the visible spectrum. In biology, we have
plenty of notable examples of sensor evolution, from the capability of bacteria of measuring food
concentration [33], to the various forms of eyes [34].
Sensors are the way that organisms and robots acquire useful information that is used to act in the
world through actuators. We assume a wide definition of actuator as a tool or mechanism that the robot
can control to change something in the world (e.g., grasping an object, moving, lighting up a LED).
Sensors and actuators are the information channels between the organism and environment and their
combined use produces what in robotics is called sensory-motor loop [35], referring to the fact that
sensors readings affect actuator commands and conversely the results of actions affect sensor readings
(note that, while in robotics the notion of sensory-motor loop is based on the relation between the robot
and the environment, in general a sensory-motor pattern in an organism does not require the definition
of an “outside” and can be only internal to the system). Therefore, it is no surprise that the evolution
of sensors and actuators is intertwined in Nature. Hence, in an artificial setting we also need to set up
a mechanism enabling the organism to act properly and choose what is good for it. Again, we need
either an evolutionary mechanism acting on populations of organisms or providing the organisms the
capability of adaptively constructing actuators, or both. En passant, we observe that, while the subject
of sensor evolution has received attention from the cybernetic community, the evolution of actuators
has not been discussed so in depth [29]. We believe the reason is to be found in the fact that, rather
than actuator evolution, the interest has been often focused on tool development.
Sensor and actuator construction essentially consists in identifying affordances, so as to make
use of something that is “useful to me”. Informally speaking, an affordance is a feature of the world
that can be used to do something useful [15,36]. This term has been introduced by Gibson [37] to
capture the fact that objects afford observers possible actions, which are directly perceived. Jamone
and co-authors [38] emphasize two aspects of affordances that are relevant for our discussion:
1. affordances are not properties of the environment alone, but they depend on sensing and actuating
capabilities of the robot; and,
2. affordance perception suggests action possibilities to the robot through the activation of
sensory-motor patterns, and it also provides a mean to predict the consequences of actions.
As a consequence, without the possibility of evolving its own sensors and actuators, a robot cannot
identify affordances and so there are no ways for it to explore possible information acquisition and
actions, and so improve. Note that an affordance may also consist in cooperating with or exploiting
other organisms’ features. An affordance can be identified either because it brings an advantage to
the organism (i.e., an accidental event that turns out to be advantageous [21]), or because it opens up
an unexpected and favorable possibility (e.g., a particular sensory-motor pattern enables the robot to
detect the size of an object). Furthermore, the fact that a given object or situation affords an organism to
do something is also the way that things get meaning. The relation between affordances and meanings
is central to our argument and it will be discussed in Section 4.
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3.3. The Controller
The missing piece in the design of an organism is a mechanism for converting the information
that is sensed by the robot, and possibly its state, into actions (i.e., the “controller” or the “control
software”). Metaphorically, we can say that the system needs a behavior policy that maps perceptions
and internal states to actions. If states and actions can be formally modeled and are time invariant,
then any formalism defining a policy is sufficient for providing a functioning controller (e.g., a Markov
machine), to be trained by a learning technique. Nevertheless, here, we are considering the case in
which sensors and actuators can evolve in time, so both the sets of states and actions can change,
and new states should be added to the policy and also new actions. In general, acting properly requires
dynamics and choice. Therefore, a viable formalism for accommodating such requirements is that of
dynamical systems, provided that they can be subject to structural changes (e.g., new variables can
be added). Memory might not be strictly required, even if, for non-trivial tasks, it is often needed,
especially when considering changing environments. Note that memory can be a stable structure, but
it can also be alternative attractors.
The action policy has to be adjusted with respect to this feature and possibly other relevant features
of the environment, such that the robot can reach its goals, in order for the robot to exploit a feature
of the environment to improve its performance. Some questions arise as to what are these relevant
features, what is the role of affordances, and how do policies emerge and improve. In addition, we also
may ask the fundamental questions regarding the nature of computation: are policies calculated in an
analogue calculation by a physical system? What is the character of the computation and improvements
of policy? How is the policy carried out physically? For these latter questions, we can provide an
answer by observing that from recent studies Hebbian and anti-Hebbian learning mechanisms have
been discovered in biochemical networks of single-cell organisms [39]. These mechanisms involve
protein translocation, signaling cascades, and chromatin memory, among others. In abstract terms,
these systems can have dynamical attractors, can alter they attractors by synapses alterations, can
evolve, and can store information in old and new attractors.
Changes in sensors, actuators, or the controller, in general, affect the phase space of the robot;
therefore, it can move to the adjacent possible [40], i.e., the space of opportunities that can be reached
starting from the actual condition. As a consequence, a policy update mechanism is needed to add
new states and actions to the current policy. The new states and actions are new symbols associated to
“meanings”. How new meanings appear and how they are linked to affordances is discussed in the
next section.
4. Affordances, Constraints and Semantics
The possibility of developing sensors and actuators, and consistently adapting the behavior policy
enable the organisms to identify affordances and create constraints that stabilize these features, thus
expanding to the adjacent realm of possibilities. Affordances are continuously created and they can be
exploited, constraints are created, and so forth.
We explain this view by means of an example of robots operating in the physical world. Let
us take a setting in which robots have to sweep the floor. Suppose that there are bumps in the room
and the locations of the bumps are correlated with the locations of the recharging sockets on the
floor. If the robots could detect the bumps and use this correlation, they could get to the floor socket
faster. Now, let us suppose that robot chassis is made of aluminium and that a robot, in the course
of sweeping the floor, stumble by accident into a rigid obstacle, and gets a dent at exactly the right
place to fit with floor bumps. This accident turns out to be beneficial to the robot, which can now
reach the recharging sockets quickly. If the dent was the phenotypical result of a mutation, this robot
would have an evolutionary advantage and its dent would be propagated, and possibly improved,
in further generations. If this is not the case, then this accident is anyway giving a surviving advantage
to the robot. The dent affords the robot to match the bump and so reach the recharging area faster.
Now, the dent becomes a bump detector and “dent” and “bump” come to exist as new meanings.
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Therefore, not only exploiting an affordance opens up new possibilities to the robot, but it also creates
meanings, i.e., it makes sense of physical, grounded properties of the world. Note that there is no
complete description of the affordances of the world because affordances are relative to the purposes
of the organism. For example, if I am a mouse and a cat is nearby, the distance to a rock under which I
can hide as compared to the distance to the cat and my running speed is the relevant affordance: there
is no external description, there is no God-like view. All of these views of organisms are situated and
specific with respect to getting to exist in a non-ergodic universe.
Creating affordances is creating information, which is, in fact, semantic information [41],
as opposed to Shannon-based information, which propagates already existing syntactic information.
Semantic information characterizes correlations in the environment that are useful for a system as
they carry significant knowledge. Affordances are carved out of a continuum, e.g., bumps and dents
become new relevant variables in a formal representation of the world. After the relevant variables have
co-created themselves, we “can name them” and new meanings come to exist. The presence or absence
of a bump, the presence or absence of a dent can now be represented by variables. As a consequence,
we can assert that semantics comes first and syntax comes later: first, the bump means something for
me (good or bad), later it gets named and the corresponding symbol can be used. In digital computers
the computations operate on the syntax (bits), but there is no semantics. The world is not a theorem.
Theorems are operations on bits, i.e., symbols, and are not the world: the world is the bumps and
dents. For these reasons, the notion of affordance is a key concept in biosemiotics, where it has been
discussed and extended since its original formulation [37]. Particularly suitable to the perspective
taken in this paper is the definition of affordance provided by Campbell et al. [42], who propose
defining “affordances as potential semiotic resources that an organism enacts (detects, reads, uses,
engages) to channel learning-as-choice in its environment”.
Let us now come back to the robotic example and imagine that another robot experiences a
damage in one of its wheels, so that a bump appears and this bump somehow fits the dent of the other
robot: now the second robot can detect the dent in the first robot and find the recharging station in
an easier way just by following the first robot. Bumps and dents, and bumps and dents detectors
evolve in the world, so we can collectively coordinate our behaviors to get what we need [21]. This
becomes our construction of mutually consistent biosemiotic systems [22,43,44]. In the biosphere, we
have evolved to mutually create mutually consistent affordances: the evolution of life is the evolution
of myriads of meanings. Therefore, finding the principles governing the emergence of the organisms is
the foundation of biosemiotics [45–47].
This creation of meanings through new emerging functions and dynamical patterns that turn
out to be useful to some organisms is also at the roots of the symbol grounding problem [48], which
concerns the way that symbols are intrinsically represented in systems. This problem has been
thoroughly discussed inside the community of artificial intelligence and artificial life [49–52] and we
believe that our perspective puts the problem in a more general context, also related to constructive
biology [53]. Strictly connected to the grounding problem is the frame problem, that deals with how an
embodied and situated system can represent and interact with the world it lives in [54–56]. Note that
the viewpoint of evolving and maintaining mutually consistent meanings provides a unified way for
dealing with both the grounding and frame problem.
The continuous identification of affordances and the construction of constraints change the phase
space of the organisms and expand it to the adjacent possible. We remark that it is not possible to
prestate new functions that emerge in this open condition. As stated before, the uses of a screwdriver
are indefinite and so are its affordances. Let us take the case of the use of an engine block as a chassis
for the tractor: it is also possible to use the engine block as a paper weight or to crack a coconut on
one of its corners. These are alternative possible uses of the same physical object and in evolution
none, one, some, or all of these uses may come to exist, for example, by Darwinian preadaptation.
Because there is no deductive relation between the use of the engine block as a chassis and the use
of the engine block to crack open coconuts, there can be no deductive theory of the evolution of
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biospheres. We are beyond deductively entailing laws: evolving biospheres are radically free [15,21].
Here, we remark that evolved systems are built of physical parts that have multiple causal features:
some of them might be selected for performing a specific function useful to the organism. For example,
we say that the heart pumps blood, because we identify, in this feature, a property functional to the
survival of an animal and we discard other irrelevant features (e.g., the heart also produces sounds).
Not only the emergence of these functions is non-deducible, but it is typical of a bricolage process,
in which causal features of objects that turn out to be useful are exploited. Note that the segmentation
of an organism into separated parts is often just a convenient simplification of our description [57].
Conversely, in engineered robotic systems, each part has its own identity and it is optimized for one
specific function: here, the interactions among parts are precisely modeled and there is no space for
affording new functions nor new emerging relations.
Concluding, the open evolution of organisms in the biosphere seems to set simple yet hard
requirements for the emergence and open evolution of artificial organisms: embodiment, the capability
of discerning what is good and bad, mechanisms for evolving sensors and actuators, and behavior
policy open to changes.
5. Criticality
The organisms in the evolving biosphere are very likely to be critical, i.e., their dynamical regime
is at the boundary between order and disorder [58,59]. This conjecture has found strong support in
biology, neuroscience, as well as computer science [60,61], and it can be expressed as the combination
of two statements:
i. critical systems are more evolvable than systems in other dynamical conditions as they attain
an optimal trade-off between mutational robustness (i.e., mutations moderately perturb the
phenotype, without introducing dramatic changes) and phenotypic innovation (i.e., mutations
can introduce significant novelty in the phenotypes); and,
ii. critical systems have advantages over ordered or disordered ones, because they optimally balance
information storage, modification and transfer, and achieve the best trade-off between the
repertoire of their possible actions and their reliability.
Therefore, the property of being critical is very likely to be found in Kantian wholes that identify and
exploit affordances in their environment and, furthermore, they cooperate among each other to survive.
If organisms are critical, their parts are not necessarily so. The advantage of being critical comes
from the necessity of interacting with other systems in a changing and dynamic environment [24].
Anyway, being critical is an advantage in evolution and because it is easier to find an advantageous
coupling with the environment [62]. Therefore, we expect to find Kantian wholes critical, but their
parts may or may not be critical, depending on the evolutionary path that occurred and the way they
are coupled with the other constituents. As a consequence, in a scenario with the evolution of artificial
organisms, criticality should play an important role and systems should be designed in such a way
that critical dynamical regimes are favored. Notably, dynamical models, such as Boolean networks,
have been shown to maximize mutual information [63], basin entropy [64], and transfer entropy [65]
when poised at the critical regime; both measures are correlated with the capability of discriminating
percept categories and act accordingly. This property is crucial for evolving organisms, because as
the number of sensors that come to exist increases and organisms use those sensors, the number of
possible combinations of percepts increases exponentially in the number of sensors. For example,
if the sensors return binary values and the number of sensors N increases in time, then the number
of possible percept patterns increases as 2N . This is just a lower bound, as we are assuming binary
percepts; organisms in Nature are rather analogical and this means that they are able to deal with a
huge number of “worlds” they can sense.
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6. Discussion and Conclusions
The ability of knowing “what’s good or bad for me”, the possibility of developing sensors and
actuators and the capability of adapting their own behavior policy are properties that enable organisms
to evolve in an ever expanding phase space. The astonishing evolution of the biosphere is beyond
physics: critical co-evolving Kantian wholes develop by following paths for which there are no
entailing laws. The question now arises as to what extent artificial systems can be built, such that they
are endowed with the properties listed above and if these properties are sufficient for the emergence of
artificial organisms.
Current advances in AI and robotics suggest a positive answer to the first part of the question [66].
Promising attempts to the online embodied evolution of robots have been proposed [67,68].
Soft robotics [69], and unconventional computing systems [70] may provide a viable approach to the
evolution of sensors and actuators, along with self-improvement of behavior policies (which, of course,
may greatly benefit from current machine learning and AI techniques).
Therefore, we can envision the availability of evolving hardware in the next future and observe
the emergence of artificial organisms. Nevertheless, a profound mystery comes now into play: what is
the role of consciousness in the evolution of the biosphere? In fact, we need constraints to choose
and do, i.e., we need qualia as constraints on what we free will choose to do. In quantum mechanics,
if physicists choose to measure the position of a particle they will find the position; if they choose to
measure an interference pattern, an interference pattern will arise. This puzzle is that it seems as if
the choice of the physicist of what to measure changes the world (either a particle or an interference
pattern comes to exist). In an analogous way, we may argue that when we choose to perceive and use
bumps, bumps come to exist [71].
Therefore, by setting up experiments with artificial systems in an open-ended evolution, we are
looking for the boundary between what can be achieved through the properties that are listed above
without consciousness, and what can be achieved with free will and qualia.
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